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Court-Imposed Modifications: Supplementing the
All-or-Nothing Approach to Discharge Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, courts faced with a discharge claim'-impossibility of perform-
ance, 2 commercial impracticability, 3 or frustration of purpose 4-have had two
alternatives: enforce the contract through an order of specific performance or dis-
charge the burdened party. 5 The reasoning behind this all-or-nothing approach is that
"[s]ince there is no fault on either side, the loss . . . must lie where it falls."-6
Recently, however, a United States District Court faced with a claim of com-
mercial impracticability rejected the all-or-nothing approach. 7 Instead, the court
modified the contract and ordered the parties to perform. s This Comment will analyze
the desirability of supplementing the all-or-nothing approach with court-imposed
modifications. First, the problems with the traditional approach will be described.9
Second, the recent decision that recognized the efficacy of court-imposed mod-
ifications will be scrutinized. 10 Third, the arguments against court-imposed mod-
ifications will be examined.'1 Last, the advantages of court-imposed modifications
and their place in modem contractual theory will be discussed. 12
1. The term "discharge" is used throughout this Comment as a generic reference to the doctrines of impossibility
of performance, commercial impracticability, and frustration of purpose.
2. The most popular definition of impossibility of performance is found in the REsTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 454 (1932): "'[Ilmpossibility means not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of extreme and
unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved." See generally 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§§ 1320-52 (1962); 18 S. WI.LsON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 1931-79 (3d ed. 1978).
3. Judge Skelly Wright, in Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966), interpreted
commercial impracticability under U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978) as requiring the following three elements: "First, a
contingency--something unexpected-must have occurred. Second, the risk of the unexpected occurrence must not have
been allocated either by agreement or by custom. Finally, occurrence of the contingency must have rendered performance
commercially impracticable." Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
4. Frustration of purpose is defined in REsTATEMiENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
REsTA'm'iENT]:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated without his fault by the
occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or circumstances indicate the
contrary.
See generally 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1353-61 (1962).
5. For contrasting views on the evolution of the discharge doctrine, compare G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT 44-48 (1974) with Farnsworth, Disputes over Omissions in Contracts, 68 COLt M. L. REv. 860, 862-68
(1968).
6. RESTATENMiENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 468 comment d (1932).
7. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
8. Id. at 78-80.
9. See infra part II.
10. See infra part III.
11. See infra part IV.
12. See infra part V.
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II. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE ALL-OR-NOTHING APPROACH
The problems with relying exclusively on the all-or-nothing approach can be
seen in three recent discharge cases. 13 These cases reveal four basic problems with
the traditional approach: first, it forces courts to stretch existing doctrines to reach a
desired result; second, it leads to undeserved gains and losses 4 accruing to one party;
third, it discourages good faith modifications; and fourth, it creates a situation in
which "the buyer [always] wins." '1 5
A. Doctrine Stretching
To harmonize the all-or-nothing approach with contractual theory, courts have
developed an array of doctrines, from implied conditions1 6 and assumption of the
risk' 7 to the more recent theory of the most efficient loss spreader. 18 Ostensibly,
these doctrines assist courts in defining "a shifting line of compromise between the
impulse to uphold the sanctity of business agreements and the desire to avoid impos-
ing obligations that are in vain or unduly burdensome." 19 However, the recent case
of Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.2 ° illustrates that it is often
difficult to fit a case within any of these doctrines.
Electric Light arose out of a 1973 agreement in which Atlas agreed to supply
Electric Light with uranium ore for a four-year period. 21 Within this four-year period,
however, the price of uranium increased by sevenfold.22 Consequently, Atlas brought
suit for discharge under the theory of commercial impracticability. 23
Initially, the court denied Atlas' claim on the theory of assumption of the risk.24
13. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981); Iowa Elec. Light
&Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'don other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979);
Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
14. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
15. This conclusion was reached by Professor Speidel in his article, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts:
Some Thoughts About Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. REv. 241, 271 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Speidel, Excusable
Nonperformance]. For an argument that the buyer should win, see Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy:
Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under U.C.C. Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REv. 545 (1976).
16. For the history and general use of implied conditions, see Speziale, The Turn of the Twentieth Century as the
Dawn of Contract "'Interpretation": Reflections in Theories of Impossibility, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 555, 583-86 (1978-1979);
Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REv.'903 (1942). For a critical assessment of implied conditions, see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, ch. 11 introductory note; Famsworth, Disputes over Omissions in Contracts, 68 CoLuMt. L.
REv. 860, 862-68 (1968); Schlegel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things-The Doctrine
of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RutrGERs L. REv. 419, 422-25 (1969).
17. The use of the assumption of risk doctrine in discharge cases is detailed in Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the
Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REV. 812, 833-39 (1961).
18. The most-efficient-loss-spreader theory is articulated in Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977). The theory is explored further in Bruce,
An Economic Analysis of the Impossibility Doctrine, I 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1982).
19. Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373, 379 (1937).
20. 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
21. Id. at 131.
22. Id. For an overview of current uranium market litigation, see Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium
Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977) (concludes Westinghouse should lose in uranium
litigation).
23. Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 131 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
24. Id. at 135.
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Next, the court buttressed its first opinion in a second opinion 5 which held that a
fifty-eight percent increase in contract price was insufficient to render the contract
impracticable, 26 that Atlas was the most efficient loss spreader,2 7 and that Atlas
should have foreseen the impact of the Middle East War on uranium prices.
28
The most defensible rationale used by the court is that Atlas' fifty-eight percent
loss was insufficient to render the contract impracticable. Because the courts have
had difficulty determining what economic burden will suffice to render a contract
impracticable, 29 a court can usually find authority to support its decision on this
point. Some commentators, however, have criticized the courts' emphasis on eco-
nomic burden. 30 They believe that the proper focus is the extent to which the per-
formance has been changed. 3' Thus, the impracticability requirement is still an
elusive concept.
The Electric Light court in its initial opinion held that Atlas failed to establish
the first prong of the impracticability test-that the price increase be a contingency
the nonoccurrence of which is a basic assumption of the contract. 32 The court in-
terpreted this prong in accordance with prevailing authority as requiring that the event
be unforeseeable.33 Recently, a number of commentators have attacked the practice
of equating the basic assumption test with a foreseeability test. They contend that this
interpretation is an unwarranted expansion of the common law into the commercial
impracticability test.
34
25. Id. at 137 (opinion II).
26. Id. at 140-41 (opinion 11).
27. Id. at 140 (opinion 1n).
28. Id.
29. The courts have reached various results in interpreting the impracticability requirement. See, e.g., American
Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine, Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972) (less than a 'A increase insufficient);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. La. 1981) (38% increase
insufficient); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (not
less than a 100% increase will suffice); see also J. WHrrE & R. SurtmRs, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMNIERCtAL CODE 133 (2d ed. 1980) (indicates a tenfold increase needed). See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 584,
604-0 (1979).
30. See Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 265-71; Note, U.C.C. § 2.615: Excusing the
Impracticable, 60 B.U.L. REv. 575 (1980).
31. See Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 265-71 (courts should concentrate on the degree to
which the performance is changed); Note, U.C.C. § 2-615: Excusing the Impracticable, 60 B.U.L. REv. 575 (1980)
(courts ovcr-cmphasize the economic loss and should instead concentrate on the degree to which the performance has been
changed).
32. 467 F. Supp. 129, 134 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (opinion I), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
33. Id.; see, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); J. WHrE & R.
SUMtuMES, HANDBOOK OF mHE LAW UNDER THE UNFo trl COMMERCIAL CODE 129-30 (2d ed. 1980); Speidel, Excusable
Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 261-62, 262 n. 66; Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving
U.C.C. Section 2.615 from the Common Laiv, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1032, 1042-50 (1978). The classic statement of the
foreseeability test was elucidated by California Justice Traynor in Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944):
The purpose of a contract is to place the risks of performance upon the promisor, and the relation of the parties,
terms of the contract, and circumstances surrounding its formation must be examined to determine whether it
can be fairly inferred that the risk of the event that has supervened to cause the alleged frustration was not
reasonably foreseeable. If it was foreseeable there should have been provision for it in the contract, and the
absence of such provision gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed.
Id. at 54, 153 P.2d at 50.
34. See Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under
U.C.C. Section 2615, 54 N.C.L. REv. 545, 567-70 (1967) (argues against interpreting a foreseeability test into
commercial impracticability); Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 261-65 (the foreseability test
strongly militates against a successful assertion of commercial impracticability by a seller); Note The Doctrine of
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Although the court in Electric Light found that the Middle East War was suf-
ficiently foreseeable to justify imposing the risk of its occurrence upon Atlas, the
court was unable to reconcile the facts with this result. Illustrative is the court's
statement, "There is no doubt that Atlas suffered burdensome increases in production
costs. There is no doubt that many of those costs were not foreseen or considered
likely to occur or to be so substantial." 35 The court also remarked that "[i]t would be
unfair to expect Atlas to have prophesied the magnitude of the increases complained
of.'"36 This contradiction illustrates that the commercial impracticability test is often
difficult to apply to the facts of a case.
The final rationale forwarded by the court was that Atlas was the most efficient
loss spreader. The most-efficient-loss-spreader theory is premised upon the applica-
tion of economic principles to the law.3 7 The basic principle behind the theory is that
a court should attempt to render the most economically efficient decision. This goal is
accomplished by placing the economic burden upon the party that can best spread the
loss over the general public.
38
In applying the most-efficient-loss-spreader theory to commercial impracticabil-
ity cases, the result is usually that the seller is the best loss spreader. 39 The rationale
for this result is either that the seller is in the best position to obtain insurance4 ' or that
the seller can best spread the loss among its customers. 4 1 The most-efficient-loss-
spreader theory can be used, therefore, to support most decisions that result in a
decision for the buyer.
The problems indicated by the preceding discussion have resulted in courts
expanding and constricting doctrines to meet the exigencies of individual cases.
B. The Accrual of "Undeserved" Gains and Losses
Professor Schwartz was the first to use the term "undeserved" to describe gains
and losses in a discharge setting. 4z According to Professor Schwartz, losses are
"undeserved" when an unbargained for risk is imposed on a party by enforcement of
the contract. 43 Because the all-or-nothing approach only affords a court two
Impossibility of Performance and the Foreseeability Test, 6 Loy. U. CMt. L.J. 575 (1975) (contends that a number of
factors could have caused the failure to provide for a contingency); Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile
Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615from the Common Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1032 (1978) (argues U.C.C. § 2-615
does not have a foreseeablility test). Professor Farnsworth advocated discarding the foreseeability test from the common
law. Farnsworth, Disputes over Omissions in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. Rev. 860, 884-87 (1968).
35. 467 F. Supp. 129, 132 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
36. Id. at 135.
37. See supra note 18.
38. Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83 passim (1977). But cf. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982)
(attacks Posner's economic analysis in the context of breach of contract).
39. This conclusion was reached by Professor Speidel in his article, Excusable Nonperformance in Sales Contracts:
Some Thoughts About Risk Management, supra note 15, at 271. See also Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable
Economy: Judicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks Under U.C.C. Section 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REv. 545 (1976).
40. Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 92 (1977).
41. Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 253.
42. Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 8 (1976).
43. Id.
COURT-IMPOSED MODIFICATIONS
options-enforcement or discharge--one party will often have to internalize the loss
caused by a supervening event.
The decision of a Missouri appeals court in Missouri Public Service Co. v.
Peabody Coal Co.' exemplifies the imposition of undeserved losses. In 1967, Pea-
body entered into a ten-year contract to supply Public Service with coal. The contract
provided for an index to adjust for inflation over the ten-year period based upon the
Industrial Commodities Index. The index, however, subsequently failed to ade-
quately adjust for inflation because of a change in economic conditions precipitated
by the Arab Oil Embargo. The failure of the index left Peabody with an estimated 3.4
million dollar loss on the contract.45 Confronted with this loss, Peabody sought
discharge from the contract under a theory of commercial impracticability.
Following the usual interpretation of commercial impracticability, the court
interpreted the requirement of the nonoccurrence of a basic assumption as a
foreseeability test.46 The court then found that Peabody failed to meet this require-
ment because Peabody should have foreseen the Arab Oil Embargo and its effect on
coal prices.47 In supporting this finding, the court stressed that Peabody had wide
experience and knowledge in the coal industry, 8 that Peabody had vast resources, 49




Assuming, contrary to the court's analysis, that Peabody did not foresee the
intervention of the Arab Oil Embargo, the court imposed a 3.4 million dollar un-
deserved loss on Peabody. A defensible argument can be made, and has been
accepted by some courts, 51 that in 1967 the Arab Oil Embargo was unforeseeable.
For example, in Freidco of Wilmington, Delaware, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank,52 the court
was able to forward a wealth of evidence to support its conclusion that in 1965 the
economic upheavals of the 1970s were unforeseeable. The court initially relied upon
expert testimony. 53 This testimony was buttressed by the 1965 National Power Sur-
vey, the most comprehensive survey up to that time, which predicted that electricity
prices would decline twenty-seven percent by 1980. 5 4 Furthermore, a number of
commentators have questioned the accuracy of court decisions finding events
foreseeable. 55 As stated by one commentator, "hindsight is twenty-twenty.", 56 Ac-
44. 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
45. Id. at 722-23.
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
48. Id. at 726.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 728.
51. See, e.g., Freideo of Wilmington, Delaware, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank, 529 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1981).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 828.
54. Id. at 827.
55. See Macaulay, Justice Traynor and the Law of Contracts, 13 STAN. L. REv. 812, 835 (1961); Note, The
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance and the Foreseeability Test, 6 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 575, 578-83 (1975); Note,
U.C.C. § 2-615: Sharp Inflationary Increases in Cost as Excuse from Performance of Contract, 50 NoTRE DAME LAW.
297, 304-06 (1974); Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615from the
Common Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 1032, 1042 (1978).
56. Comment, Contractual Flexibility in a Volatile Economy: Saving U.C.C. Section 2-615from the Common Law,
72 Nw. U.L. REV. 1032, 1042 (1978).
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cepting both the commentator's arguments and the findings of the court in Freidco, it
is evident that an undeserved loss was imposed on Peabody.
Iowa Electric provides another example of the imposition of undeserved losses.
The Iowa Electric court, like the court in Missouri Public Service, found that Atlas
foresaw the occurrence of the supervening event. 57 The Iowa Electric court also
found, however, that "many of [the] costs were not foreseen." 58 Further, the court
acknowledged that it would be "unfair to [have expected] Atlas to have prophesied
the magnitude of the increases."-59 Thus, at least part of the loss imposed upon Atlas
was undeserved.
These cases aptly illustrate that even though the parties may not have intended to
allocate a risk to one party, adherence to the all-or-nothing approach requires the
imposition. By presenting only two options, the traditional approach forces the court
to impose the unbargained for risk on one party.
C. Discouraging Good Faith Modifications
A third criticism of the all-or-nothing approach is that it discourages good faith
modifications. The decision in Missouri Public Service illustrates this problem.
Because Public Service was receiving coal at just one-third of the market price,
Peabody sought a modification of the contract.60 In response to Peabody's overtures,
Public Service offered a one dollar per ton price increase. After Peabody rejected this
offer, Public Service refused to negotiate further. 61 Confronted with Public Service's
obstinance, Peabody brought a claim of bad faith. The court summarily dismissed
Peabody's claim, stating that "[w]here an enforceable, untainted contract exists,
refusing modification ... does not constitute bad faith .... 62
By making this statement the court apparently held that unless one party can
establish that a contract is tainted (for example, by duress, incapacity, or un-
conscionability), the other party is never obligated to enter into a modification. This
holding would permit a party advantaged by a supervening event to refuse all mod-
ification proposals. Considering the current emphasis on good faith modifications, 63
this rule appears overly broad. For example, it is arguable that a failure to accept a
reasonable modification when neither party foresaw the intervention of an event
could constitute bad faith. This argument is supported by the high standards of good
faith and fair dealing imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code64 and the Restate-
57. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
58. 467 F. Supp. 129, 132 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979).
59. Id. at 135.
60. 583 S.W.2d 721, 722-23 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
61. Id. at 723.
62. Id. at 725.
63. See PESATEmENT, supra note 4, § 89; U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978).
64. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1978) defines good faith as "honesty in fact" and as requiring "observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing."
1084 [Vol. 44:1079
COURT-IMPOSED MODIFICATIONS
ment (Second) of Contracts. 65 Complementing these high standards are the pro-
visions permitting easy modification. 66
To be consistent with these provisions, discharge doctrines should be applied to
facilitate modifications. Under the all-or-nothing approach, if an advantaged party,
who is not obligated to enter into a modification, refuses to modify the contract, the
burdened party has limited alternatives-threaten to cease performing, cease per-
forming, or seek discharge-all of which will usually lead to litigation. Therefore,
the joint effect of not imposing a duty of modification upon an advantaged party and
of adhering to the all-or-nothing approach may be to increase the likelihood of
litigation.
D. The Buyer Always Wins
A final problem inherent in the application of the all-or-nothing approach is that
it creates a situation in which the buyer usually wins. First, the buyer will usually win
if an economic analysis is applied to the case, because sellers are often in the best
position to insure against possible supervening events. 7 In addition, sellers often can
spread the losses among many customers, and a seller's losses may be absorbed by
other diversified interests.68 After an extended analysis of Judge Posner's most-
efficient-loss-spreader theory, Professor Speidel concludes that the theory heavily
militates against a successful assertion of commercial impracticability by a seller. 69
Professor Speidel also contends that the present interpretation of commercial
impracticability strongly militates in favor of the buyer. He argues that interpreting a
foreseeability test into commercial impracticability favors the buyer since ex-
perienced sellers usually know that a wide array of supervening events might occur.7"
This, Speidel reasons, causes courts to find that the seller foresaw the event
notwithstanding that the seller could not have predicted the probability of the event
occurring or that the parties may not have intended to impose the risk upon the
seller.7 1 Furthermore, Speidel argues that equating economic burden with the im-
practicability requirement also favors the buyer because courts hesitate to discharge a
seller for fear of undermining the stability of contracts.72 The conclusion that the
65. sTATEMErr, supra note 4, § 205 equates good faith with adherence to "community standards of decency,
fairness or reasonableness." Id. § 205 comment a. Further, it "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and
consistency with justified expectations of the other party." Id.
66. REsTATEMErr, supra note 4, § 89 eliminates the requirement of consideration if the modification is fair and
equitable. Similarly, U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978) eliminates the requirement of consideration if the modification is for a
legitimate commercial reason.
67. See Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-91 (1977).
68. See id. at 94-95; Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 253.
69. Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 248-71.
70. Id. at 260-65.
71. Id. at 265-71.
72. An excellent example of this is the courts' uniform denial of impracticability claims during the cotton shortage of
the early 1970s. See, e.g., Bradford v. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n, 539 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 1976) (citing
cases); R.N. Kelly Cotton Merchant, Inc. v. York, 494 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co., Inc. v.
Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975); Austin v. Montgomery, 336 So. 2d 745 (Miss. 1976).
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buyer is likely to win in discharge cases is further illustrated by the decisions in
Electric Light73 and Public Service.74
E. The Loss Will Not Go Away
7 5
The problem of the loss not going away was deliberately excluded from the
initial list of problems 76 because regardless of how a court applies the all-or-
nothing approach, the loss due to the supervening event will have to be internalized
by one party. Illustrative of this point is the United States District Court opinion in
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
77
Florida Power arose out of a 1966 agreement in which Westinghouse promised
to both provide fuel for and to remove spent fuel from two nuclear power plants. 78 At
the time of contracting, Westinghouse believed that the spent nuclear fuel could be
profitably reprocessed. 79 This early optimism, however, proved unfounded when
Westinghouse was unable to secure a reprocessing contract. As a result, Florida
Power was left with ever increasing amounts of nuclear waste8 the disposal cost of
which would be between twenty and forty-four million dollars.
81
The court held that Westinghouse assumed the risk of being unable to find a
reprocessor. To a large extent, the court's holding was based upon its factual finding
that Westinghouse's officers knew, when the contract was signed, that the future of
nuclear reprocessing was uncertain. This finding permitted the court to reason that
Westinghouse's failure to provide for this uncertainty in the contract was an assump-
tion of its risk. This reasoning, although often employed," breaks down when one
considers that a variety of circumstances could have caused Westinghouse's omis-
sion.
The fallacy that the parties could have provided for every foreseeable contin-
gency has been exposed by a number of commentators. Professors Goetz and Scott
have argued that "[s]uch definitive obligations may be impractical because of inabil-
ity to ... characterize complex adaptations adequately even when the contingencies
themselves [have been] identified in advance.'83 Professor Macaulay was one of the
first to point out that "[t]oo often . . . businessmen really have not reached agree-
ment on the difficult issues, but have ignored them to avoid argument. "84 Moreover,
Professor Macneil has continually asserted that "planning is inherently filled with
73. See supra text accompanying notes 21-41.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 44-56.
75. This phrase, although not an exact quotation, comes from F. KESSLER & G. GuHsoRE, CoNTRACTs: CAsES AND
MATERIALS 743 (2d ed. 1970).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
77. 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
78. Id. at 444.
79. Westinghouse's optimism was based to a large extent upon the active encouragement and support of the
government in the reprocessing field. Id. at 448.
80. Id. at 447-48.
81. Id. at 460.
82. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 584, 597 (1979).
83. Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relationship Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1981).
84. Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, PRAc. LAW., Nov. 1963, at 13,
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gaps. ' 85 Thus, the reason for Westinghouse's failure to provide for the uncertainty of
nuclear processing is far from clear.
Although finding for Florida Power, the court refused to order specific perform-
ance. Instead, it admitted that it "fervently hope[d] that it would not be called upon to
draft a [specific performance] decree." 86 The court then informed the parties that it
intended to "meet and confer with counsel, in an effort to assist them in reaching
agreement." 8 7 Plainly, the court was appalled at the prospect of imposing a twenty to
forty-four million dollar loss on Westinghouse, and hence spent the rest of the
opinion ordering the parties to settle.88
The Florida Power court was confronted with a situation that ordinarily
accompanies the application of the all-or-nothing approach to discharge cases: a
tremendous loss must be imposed upon one party since the loss will not simply go
away. In applying the all-or-nothing approach this outcome is inevitable. In Florida
Power the court recognized this dilemma, and therefore attempted to ameliorate the
loss through a settlement. What the court actually needed, however, was an alterna-
tive to the traditional approach that would permit the equitable distribution of the loss
between the parties.
III. RECOGNIZING THE EFFICACY OF COURT-IMPOSED MODIFICATIONS
A. Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc.
89
The traditional approach was rejected by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania in Aluminum Co. ofAmerica v. Essex Group, Inc.90
Judge Teitelbaum, to avoid the problems associated with the traditional approach,
abandoned the all-or-nothing approach and modified the contract to effectuate the
parties' original intentions.
The case originated with a twenty-year toll conversion contract negotiated be-
tween the Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) and Essex in 1967. The con-
tract provided that Essex would deliver alumina91 to ALCOA's refinery for conver-
sion into molten aluminum. In order to adjust for changes in ALCOA's nonlabor
costs, the agreement contained an index based upon the Wholesale Price Index-
Industrial Commodities. 92 The index had been developed with the help of the noted
economist Alan Greenspan. 93 Further, Essex had completed its own study of the
85. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Rela-
tional Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 873 (1978).
86. 517 F. Supp. 440, 461 (E.D. Va. 1981).
87. Id. at 462.
88. The court concluded its opinion by stating, "In view of the fact that the interests of both parties and the public
would best be served by an expeditious and final resolution of this matter, both parties are urged ... to reach agreement,
rather than in preparing to further litigate ..... Id. at 462.
89. 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The case was appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, but was settled.
90. Id.
91. Alumina is an oxide used primarily as a source for metal aluminum. WEBSTER's THiRD NEw INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 64 (1961).
92. 499 F. Supp. 53, 57-58 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
93. Id. at 58.
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index and concluded that the index correlated closely with ALCOA's nonlabor
costs. 9 4 At first, the index performed as expected, but subsequent economic up-
heavals resulted in ALCOA's nonlabor costs increasing by five hundred percent
while the index increased only one hundred percent. 95 This discrepancy left ALCOA
with an estimated sixty million dollar loss on the contract. 96
Following the all-or-nothing approach, Judge Teitelbaum would have had to
either discharge ALCOA or impose specific performance. However, because of the
actions taken by Essex in reliance on the contract, 97 discharging ALCOA would have
imposed severe economic burdens on Essex.
Initially, to perform its part of the agreement, Essex entered into a separate
long-term agreement to obtain a supply of alumina. 98 Next, to facilitate the contract,
Essex built a molten aluminum processing plant adjacent to ALCOA's refinery. 9 9
Finally, the supplies of molten aluminum Essex was receiving from the agreement
permitted Essex to enter the aluminum public utility cable business, the aluminum
extrusion business, and the aluminum magnet wire business.'"0 Clearly, Essex had a
significant incentive to ensure that the contract would remain in force.
Similarly, ALCOA had a vested interest in the continuing vitality of the con-
tract. ALCOA justifiably expected to receive four cents of profit per pound of alumi-
num refined. 10 ' Although this finding was disputed by Essex, 10 2 the four cents per
pound expectation was confirmed by two of Essex' internal documents that had been
prepared before the contract was signed.10 3 Therefore, whenever ALCOA's profits
fell below four cents per pound, the contract price was falling below ALCOA's
expectation interest." °
The subsequent malfunction of the index put Judge Teitelbaum in an untenable
position. If he imposed specific performance on ALCOA, ALCOA would have to
internalize a tremendous undeserved loss. Initially, sixty million dollars of losses
may not appear significant. This figure, however, represents only the losses that
would be incurred because the cost of refining exceeded the contract price. The figure
fails to take into account the additional four cents per pound expectancy loss. Con-
sidering that approximately seventy-five million pounds of aluminum would be re-
94. Id. Before entering into the agreement with ALCOA, Essex had spent two years negotiating similar contracts
with two other companies. Appellee's Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 4. ALCOA.
Since Essex spent three years negotiating with three different companies, it strains common sense to believe that Essex did
not fully understand the implications of the contract with ALCOA.
95. 499 F. Supp. 53, 59 table I (W.D. Pa. 1980).
96. See id.
97. The term "reliance" is being used in this Comment to mean the change in a party's position due to its actions
taken in reliance on the promise. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54
(1936); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 344(b).
98. 499 F. Supp. 53, 82 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
99. Brief of Defendant Essex Group, Inc. at 30, ALCOA.
100. Id.
101. See 499 F. Supp. 53, 58 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
102. See Brief of Defendant Essex Group, Inc. at 3-16, ALCOA.
103. Appellee's Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 27, ALCOA.
104. The term "expectation interest" is being used in this Comment as meaning "the value of the expectancy which
the promise created." Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936); see
also REsTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 344(a).
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fined each year,10 5 ALCOA's losses would have been markedly increased. Also,
because ALCOA was locked into the contract price of 36.35 cents per pound of
aluminum, ALCOA was unable to take advantage of the 73.13 cents per pound
market price.' 06 Moreover, Essex was taking advantage of this situation by selling
twenty-five percent of the refined aluminum on the open market. The 36.35 cents per
pound contract price was permitting Essex to underbid ALCOA and take ALCOA's
customers. 10 7 Thus, an order of specific performance would have imposed sub-
stantial undeserved losses on ALCOA (ALCOA neither foresaw nor assumed the risk
of the malfunctioning of the index); Essex' position if ALCOA were discharged,
however, would have been equally burdensome.
Initially, the processing plant built by Essex next to ALCOA's refining plant
would have been closed. 108 Moreover, Essex would still have been liable under the
separate long-term agreement for alumina. ' 9 Considering that Essex needed approx-
imately seventy-five million pounds of alumina refined per year, it is unlikely that a
suitable replacement refiner could have been found. Even assuming arguendo that a
suitable refiner could have been found, the price would have been nearly double the
contract price. 1 0 Furthermore, during the period that Essex was unable to find a
suitable refiner, Essex would have had to withdraw from the aluminum public utility
and the aluminum extrusion businesses.111 Finally, in considering these con-
sequences, one must remember that all of these losses would have been undeserved
since Essex neither foresaw nor assumed the risk of the index malfunctioning.
Faced with these two alternatives under the all-or-nothing approach, Judge
Teitelbaum abandoned the traditional approach and chose a third alternative. After
finding that the losses were sufficient to render the contract impracticable, 112 he cited
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 272(2) for the proposition that a court,
instead of following the all-or-nothing approach, could modify the contract. 113 Judge
Teitelbaum then modified the contract by increasing the price to Essex, but also by
reducing ALCOA's profit to one cent per pound.14 Thus, in formulating the mod-
ification, Judge Teitelbaum attempted to effectuate the parties' original intentions. 15
B. Advantages of Court-Imposed Modifications over the All-or-Nothing Approach in
the Context of ALCOA
As noted earlier, the all-or-nothing approach has four basic problems. 116 These
105. See 499 F. Supp. 53, 59 table I (W.D. Pa. 1980).
106. See id.
107. Appellee's Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 4, ALCOA.
108. Brief of Defendant Essex Group, Inc. at 30, ALCOA.
109. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
110. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
111. Brief of Defendant Essex Group, Inc. at 30, ALCOA.
112. 499 F. Supp. 53, 73-76 (,V.D. Pa. 1980).
113. Id. at 79 n.21 (citing RESTATEMiENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrAc-rS § 296(2) (unofficial version), which became
§ 272(2) of the final version).
114. Id. at 80.
115. To establish their original intentions, both ALCOA and Essex called numerous witnesses, compiling hundreds
of pages of testimony. Appellee's Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 8--40, ALCOA.
116. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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problems, although not completely eliminated, are ameliorated by the use of court-
imposed modifications. The ALCOA case is an excellent example of this point.
The most obvious change that occurred as a result of the modification in ALCOA
was the division of the losses caused by the malfunction of the index. By imposing a
modification, Judge Teitelbaum was able to equalize the burden. While Essex was
forced to pay a higher price for the molten aluminum, ALCOA correspondingly lost
three of its four cents per pound expectation interest."1 7 Hence, instead of imposing
the entire burden upon one party-as is required by the all-or-nothing approach-the
loss was equitably split between the parties.
This equitable division of loss contrasts with the problem created by the tradi-
tional approach, which results in the loss not going away." 8 In ALCOA Judge
Teitelbaum recognized this problem and alleviated it by formulating an appropriate
modification. Even though both parties had to internalize part of the loss, by splitting
the loss with a modification, the contract continued to be viable; ALCOA continued
receiving a profit and Essex continued receiving molten aluminum.
Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the conclusion that when a court imposes
a modification, neither party wins or loses. Although technically ALCOA won its
claim of commercial impracticability, " 9 it failed to reap the windfall it would have
under the traditional approach. 120 Instead, ALCOA was forced to give up significant
profits in order to compensate for Essex' price increase. Thus, whether the buyer or
the seller wins is of little significance if a modification is imposed.
Furthermore, court-imposed modifications may increase the impetus for parties
to reach an out-of-court settlement. For example, it is arguable that if both Essex and
ALCOA had known that litigation of the commercial impracticability issue might
have resulted in a modification, they never would have litigated the issue. Accepting
the premise that ALCOA would have brought the suit only if it were the most prudent
course of action-if the benefits to be gained by the litigation outweighed the costs-
then ALCOA would not have brought suit if the result of the litigation was equivalent
to what it could have achieved in an out-of-court settlement. Supporting this conclu-
sion is the avoidance of significant legal fees that would have resulted from an
out-of-court settlement.
Finally, court-imposed modifications may help to stabilize the current law of
discharge because courts will not fear that permitting discharge will merely let the
party out of a bad contract or will undermine the confidence of people in their
contracts. Since in court-imposed modifications the loss is apportioned, even assum-
ing that one party has merely made a bad contract, that party will not be released but
will be forced to internalize some of the loss. Further, because the modification
should seek to effectuate the parties' original intentions, the parties' positions in
117. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
120. If ALCOA had been discharged, it could have almost doubled its prices. See supra note 106 and accompanying
text. In addition, ALCOA would have been in an excellent position to extract a very favorable contract from Essex
because of Essex' reliance. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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relation to each other after the modification should approximate their positions at the
time of contracting.
C. Long-Term Contracts
To fully understand the discharge cases that have been discussed, the unique
characteristics of the agreements utilized by the parties-long-term contracts-must
be analyzed. This analysis is especially important because court-imposed mod-
ifications will probably be used only in cases involving long-term contracts.
First, because of their extended duration, long-term contracts pose problems of
risk management. For example, it is apparent that a twenty-year contract cannot
provide for every possible contingency. 12 ' This inability forces the parties to provide
for flexible processes to help fill any gaps that arise.' 2 2 These flexible processes,
however, sometimes fail to perform adequately, as evidenced by the indexes used in
Public Service123 and ALCOA, 2 4 and thus may ultimately result in litigation instead
of dispute resolution.
Second, long-term contracts produce very complex and specialized reliance.1
2 5
The reliance by a party upon the long-term agreement will often manifest itself in a
way that increases the incentive for continued performance.' 26 The increased in-
centive to perform is aptly illustrated by Essex' building a processing plant adjacent
to ALCOA's refinery. 127 Another example is Florida Power's constructing two nu-
clear plants based, in part, upon Westinghouse's promise to remove the spent nuclear
fuel. 128
Last, long-term contracts may directly affect the public interest. The public
interest may be implicated because discharging a party will result in direct imposition
of price increases upon the general public.129 Alternatively, the public may benefit if
litigation is avoided and an out-of-court settlement privately apportioning the loss is
reached.130 Moreover, because the contractual relationship may enable the contract-
ing parties to compete in other fields, the termination of the contract may adversely
affect the public interest by decreasing competition. 131 Thus, characteristics of long-
term contracts often may exacerbate the problems associated with a discharge case.
121. Professor Macneil describes this as one of the two inherent characteristics of long-term relationships. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law,
72 Nw. U.L. R-v. 854, 865 (1978).
122. Professor Macneil describes this as the second inherent characteristic of long-term relationships. Id. at 865.
123. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
125. See Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance, supra note 15, at 273-74.
126. Id. at 274.
127. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
128. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440, 444-46 (E.D. Va. 1981).
129. See, e.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 865 (1979). The court, in supporting its order of specific'performance, pointed out that Public Service was a public
utility and hence that any price increase to it would be imposed upon the general public. Id. at 725.
130. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 517 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Va. 1981). The
court, in supporting its attempt to force the parties to settle, stated that a settlement would be in the public's best interest,
id. at 462, and would best accommodate "the best interests of both Florida's ratepayers and Westinghouse's sharehold-
ers," id. at 461.
131. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (v.D. Pa. 1980). The discharging of
ALCOA would have forced Essex out of several aluminum businesses. See supra note It1 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE CASE AGAINST COURT-IMPOSED MODIFICATIONS
Even though court-imposed modifications may have advantages over the tradi-
tional approach, a number of arguments can be raised against imposing a modifica-
tion. Four basic arguments have been forwarded: first, court-imposed modifications
are contrary to the maxim that a court will not make contracts for the parties; second,
court-imposed modifications will undermine the stability of contracts; third, no prec-
edent for court-imposed modifications exists; and fourth, court-imposed mod-
ifications will create judicial manageability problems.
A. The Courts Will Not Make Contracts for the Parties
It has often been repeated that "[t]he courts will not consider the hardship or the
expense or the loss to the one party or the meagerness or the uselessness of the result
to the other. They will neither make nor modify contracts nor dispense with their
performance." 132 In the face of this maxim, court-imposed modifications appear to
be a revolutionary innovation. However, while courts have often repeated this
maxim, they have also developed doctrines to circumvent it.
133
In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of classical contract theory,
134
admitted that courts circumvented this maxim by implying conditions into contracts.
Justice Holmes believed that a court might imply a condition for a variety of reasons:
You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of
some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion
as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of
exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical
conclusions. 135
From this statement, it appears that even though Justice Holmes might have balked at
openly modifying a contract, he instead would, and once did, simply imply a condi-
tion into the contract to reach the desired outcome. 136 Subsequently, however, courts
went beyond implied conditions and developed a more potent doctrine to circumvent
the maxim-the doctrine of the intentions of the parties.
As early as 1941, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals conceded that "'[i]n-
tentions of the parties' is a good formula to square doctrine with result."' 137 The use
of the "intentions of the parties" doctrine to modify contracts became so pervasive 138
that Samuel Williston, Justice Holmes' protege, 139 argued that the courts should stop
132. Cameron-Hawn Realty Co. v. City of Albany, 207 N.Y. 377, 381-82, 101 N.E. 162, 163 (1913).
133. Kessler and Gilmore note that one may consider the courts as having made contracts for the parties and
equalized losses for over 100 years. F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 744 (2d ed. 1970).
134. The classical, objective theory of contracts and Justice Holmes' part in its development are detailed in G.
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 5-55 (1974).
135. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897).
136. In Hawkins v. Graham, 149 Mass. 284, 21 N.E. 312 (1889), Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, implied a condition of reasonableness into a satisfaction clause to prevent an arbitrary
withholding of consent. Id. at 287-88, 21 N.E. at 313.
137. Parev Prod. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc., 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941).
138. See id. at 149 (citing cases).
139. For a discussion of Williston's part in attempting to codify the classical contract theory, see Ricketts v.




cloaking their actions under this doctrine. Williston believed that the courts should
admit their reasons for qualifying promises:
Any qualification of the promise is based on the unfairness or unreasonableness of
giving it the absolute force which its words clearly state. In other words, because the court
thinks it fair to qualify the promise, it does so and quite rightly; but clearness of though
would be increased if it were plainly recognized that the qualification of the prom-
ise ... is not based on any expression of intention by the parties.
40
Hence, both Justice Holmes and Samuel Williston knew and approved of courts'
covertly modifying contracts to reach equitable results.
Today, the Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts provide a court with gap-fillers that can be imposed when the parties fail to
provide for certain events. In accordance with these authorities, a court can imply that
an offer is open to acceptance for a reasonable time, 14 ' that an offer can be accepted
by any reasonable medium in any reasonable manner, 142 that a contract is to last for a
reasonable time, 143 and that a contract is to be for a reasonable price. 144 These
examples illustrate that today a court can often imply reasonable terms into a contract
when the parties have failed to provide a term. Thus, contrary to the maxim that a
court should not make contracts for the parties, a court may make a substantial
portion of a contract.145
B. The Sanctity of Contracts
Although the maxim that a court should not make contracts for the parties has
lost much of its force, the underlying policy which it supports, that people should be
able to rely upon their contracts, is still of vital concern to the courts. 146 At first it
appears that court-imposed modifications would undermine the stability of contracts
by permitting courts to rewrite agreements. Upon further examination, however, it
becomes apparent that court-imposed modifications, if properly imposed, can help to
stabilize contractual relationships. The stabilizing effect that court-imposed mod-
ifications can have upon contractual relationships will be the greatest in long-term
contracts.
Because long-term contracts extend over a long period of time and often involve
a series of performances, they contain gaps. 47 The existence of gaps in an agreement
manifestly creates uncertainty in the contractual relationship. The uncertainty related
to the use of long-term contracts is magnified when one of the parties begins to
structure its business around the contract.' 48 It follows then that the possibility of an
140. 18 S. WiLuSroN, A TREATISE ON TIM LAW OF CONTACTS § 1937, at 33 (3d ed. 1978) (footnote omitted).
141. See RESTATEtENT, supra note 4, § 41(1); U.C.C. § 2-309(l) (1978).
142. See RESTATEmENT, supra note 4, § 65; U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1978).
143. See REsTATErmENT, supra note 4, § 204 comment d; U.C.C. § 2-309 (1978).
144. See REsTATEmENT, supra note 4, § 204 comment d; U.C.C. § 2-305 (1978).
145. For example, in a sale of goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, the only term that must be in
writing and signed is the quantity term. U.C.C. § 2-201 comment 1 (1978). All the other terms are supplied by the Code's
gap fillers, U.C.C. 88 2-305, 2-307 to -311 (1978). See also U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
146. See U.C.C. § 2-601 comment 1 (1978).
147. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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unforeseen event causing the contract to be terminated deters businesspeople from
entering into long-term contracts. This reasoning, however, changes significantly in
the context of court-imposed modifications.
Businesspeople are likely to feel confident about entering into and relying upon
a long-term contractual relationship if they do not have to worry about the interven-
tion of supervening events resulting in the termination of the agreement. A
businessperson's confidence in the long-term agreement will also be augmented by
the knowledge that the modification will be directed towards effectuating the original
contractual intentions. Moreover, because both contracting parties will be aware that
litigation in a discharge situation may result in a court-imposed modification and
because neither party would want to incur the costs associated with extended litiga-
tion unless a significant economic advantage could be gained, the availability of
court-imposed modifications provides increased impetus to reach an out-of-court
modification.
The all-or-nothing approach, on the other hand, may actually increase the likeli-
hood of litigation. A buyer receiving a windfall due to the intervention of a superven-
ing event is likely to seek an order of specific performance, for the discharge doc-
trines favor the buyer.' 4 9 Also, because an advantaged party is not obligated to
modify the contract, 150 the disadvantaged party may have no alternative but to liti-
gate. Thus, in comparison to the all-or-nothing approach, court-imposed mod-
ifications may reinforce the stability of contractual relationships by increasing
businesspeople's confidence in long-term contracts and by increasing the incentive to
reach an out-of-court modification.
C. Lack of Precedent
Although the ALCOA decision is the only explicit American case law authority
for court-imposed modifications, another district court in Freidco of Wilmington,
Delaware, Ltd. v. Farmers Bank,'5 ' in dicta, approved of ALCOA and court-imposed
modifications.' 5 2 Moreover, authority supporting court-imposed modifications can
149. See supra subpart II(D).
150. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
151. 529 F. Supp. 822 (D. Del. 1981).
152. Freidco involved a suit of commercial impracticability brought by Freidco to terminate a 30-year lease
agreement signed in 1965. Id. at 824. The parties had initially agreed to a proportional distribution of the utility costs with
Farmers Bank's share subject to a $1.10 per square foot ceiling. Id. Although original estimates predicted that the utility
price would be between 49-52 cents per square foot, id. at 828, subsequent utility price increases caused the utility price
to rise to $1.43 per square foot, id. at 824. The court refused to find that this increase was sufficient to render the contract
impracticable. Id. at 829-30. Nevertheless, the court noted that at the current rate of increase the contract would become
impracticable before its termination. Id. at 830 & n. 8. At this juncture, the court in a footnote cited approvingly to both
ALCOA and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 272 and stated that if "commercial impracticability [had] been
shown, the 'reformation' remedy [Freidco] seeks would be a relief alternative open to the Court." Id. at 830 n.9. Thus, at
least one other court appears willing in the proper circumstances to supplement the all-or-nothing approach with
court-imposed modifications.
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be found in the commentaries on discharge cases,' 53 the Uniform Commercial
Code, 154 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,' 55 and foreign jurisdictions.' 56
The commentators have long argued for an alternative to the all-or-nothing
approach. In 1960, a student commentator proposed a statutory loss-splitting
scheme.' 57 Addison Mueller stated in 1967 that a split-the-loss policy in discharge
cases would be "eminently sensible."' 158 Kessler and Gilmore in their casebook
support a loss-sharing approach to discharge cases by analogizing to maritime law. 159
Professor Macneil contends that in discharge cases the aim of courts should not be to
"[pick] up the pieces of broken contracts," but to continue the contractual
relationships.' 60 Other commentators have also advocated the imposition of mod-
ifications in discharge cases.' 6 '
Authority for court-imposed modifications also may be found in the Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-615, comment 6. This comment provides that
[in situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either answer when the
issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no excuse," adjustment under the various
provisions of this Article is necessary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity
and assurance and on the reading of all the provisions in the light of their purposes, and
the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles in the furtherance of commercial
standards and good faith. 162
The comment seemingly foresees a common sense, pragmatic approach to discharge
cases. This proposition is evidenced by the reference to the provisions on good faith,
which connotes that particular attention should be given to "preserv[ing] the flexible
character of commercial contracts."163 Furthermore, the general policy of Article
Two is arguably twofold: increasing the security associated with commercial con-
tracts' 64 and keeping contracting parties together. 165 Court-imposed modifications
are consistent with comment 6 to section 2-615 because they effectuate both of these
goals.' 66
153. See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
157. Note, Apportioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J.
1054 (1960).
158. Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 WIs. L. REv. 833, 837.
159. F. KESSLER & G. Giusotci, CON'rRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 743-44 (2d ed. 1970).
160. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Loisv, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 875, 873-76 (1978).
161. See Schmitt & Wollschlager, Section 2-615 "Commercial Impracticability": Making the Impracticable
Practicable, 81 Comt. L.J. 9, 14 (1976) (contends modifications are necessary to protect small businesses and insure a
stable economy); Note, U.C.C. § 2-615: Sharp Inflationary Increases in Cost as Excuse from Performance of Contract,
50 NoTRE DAME LAW. 297, 306-08 (1974) (argues for price adjustments in borderline cases).
162. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 6 (1978).
163. Id. § 2-208 comment 3.
164. See, e.g., id. § 2-609 comment 1.
165. See, e.g., id. § 2-612(2).
166. On increasing the security of contractual relationships, see infra subpart V(A). On keeping contracting parties
together, see infra subpart V(B). See also Schmitt & Wollschlager, supra note 161, at 14 (concluding, after a similar
analysis, that § 2-615 should be interpreted to permit flexible dispute resolution).
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The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has adopted a provision analogous to the
Uniform Commercial Code section 2-615 comment 6. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 272(2)167 provides that when the traditional approach "will not
avoid injustice" in discharge cases, the court may grant relief "on such terms as
justice requires." 1 68 Comment c to section 272 elaborates upon this standard by
stating that a court should supply a term that is "reasonable under the circumstances"
to "salvage a part of the agreement that is still executory. "169 Comment c also cites
to section 204 ("Supplying an Omitted Essential Term"). Section 204 advises a court
to supply a term that comports with "community standards of fairness and policy"
rather than analyze a "hypothetical model of the bargaining process.' 170 The
Restatement thus advocates a straightforward approach to modifying contracts rather
than a formalistic legal approach and, like the Uniform Commercial Code, provides
authority for a court to impose a modification.
A wealth of foreign precedent also favors court-imposed modifications. German
courts, through the application of the doctrine of good faith (True und Glauben),
impose modifications in discharge cases.17 1 In France, however, the courts are split:
administrative courts recognize the viability of court-imposed modifications, but the
civil courts adhere to the doctrine offorce-majeure. 172 Switzerland, through statutory
provisions, permits its courts in discharge cases to either increase the contract price or
rescind the agreement. 173 In addition, both Italy and Greece have codified the doc-
trine of court-imposed modifications.174 Finally, the doctrine of changed circum-
stances (Jijo Henko) enables Japanese courts to equitably adjust contracts.' 75 Con-
sidering the abundance of foreign precedent and the existing American authority, the
lack of precedent argument should not preclude a court from imposing a modifica-
tion.
D. Judicial Manageability
If the efficacy of court-imposed modifications is recognized, the question arises
whether the courts will be capable of managing the mass of evidence necessary for
fashioning an appropriate modification. For example, in ALCOA over 2000 pages of
167. For a brief discussion of § 272(2) and its possible ramifications, see Young, Half Measures, 81 CoL.sa. L.
Rev. 19, 31-34 (1981).
168. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 272(2).
169. Id. § 272(2) comment c.
170. Id. § 204 comment d.
171. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 93 app. (W.D. Pa. 1980); Berman, Excuse
for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. Rev. 1413, 1420 n. 15
(1963); Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18 DuQ. L. RE%,. 551,
553-54 (1980); Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 CoLurs. L. REv. 287,296-99
(1958).
172. See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of Contract Practices in International Trade, 63 CoLum.
L. Rv. 1413, 1421 n. 16 (1963); Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative
Law, 18 DuQ. L. Rev. 551, 554-55 (1980); Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58
COLuM. L. REv. 287, 301-03 (1958).
173. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 93 app. (W.D. Pa. 1980); Smit, Frustration
of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolidation, 58 CoLuM. L. Rv. 287, 289-96 (1958).
174. See Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative Law, 18 DuQ. L.
REv. 551, 555-56 (1980).
175. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 93 app. (W.D. Pa. 1980); Henderson,
Contract Problems in U.S.-Japanese Joint Ventures, 39 WASH. L. Rv. 479, 511-12 (1964).
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testimony were amassed in a five-week trial. 176 Moreover, a significant part of the
testimony from the twenty-two witnesses 177 was parol.1 78 Even though the problems
with creating such a sizable record ostensibly militate against the use of court-
imposed modifications, these problems are far from insurmountable.
Although a problem with parol evidence may have been present in ALCOA,
neither Essex nor ALCOA invoked the parol evidence rule. 179 This failure followed
from the court's desire to impose a modification that effectuated the parties' original
intentions. If this is a court's goal, then both parties will try to establish their
original intentions in a way most favorable to their positions. Since the best way to
establish intent is through parol testimony, the parties will both want and need to
introduce parol testimony. Admittedly, the problems accompanying the compiling of
a massive testimonial record cannot easily be explained away; they must be consid-
ered, however, in the context of the advantages to be gained by the imposition of a
modification.
As previously discussed, several advantages can be gained through the use of
court-imposed modifications. Imposition of a modification may benefit the public
through decreased prices or increased competition. 1 0 A court-imposed modification
may also help to stabilize the law in discharge cases because the court would not have
to stretch existing doctrines to reach a supportable result under the traditional
approach.181 Moreover, imposing a modification may increase the security of long-
term contractual relationships by both decreasing the impetus to litigate and increas-
ing the likelihood of an out-of-court modification.'
82
The administrative problems associated with court-imposed modifications be-
come less compelling when considered in light of the benefits to be derived from their
use. In short, while compiling an extensive testimonial record may prove burden-
some, it certainly can be managed.
183
V. Tim CASE FOR COURT-IMPOSED MODIFICATIONS
The advantages of court-imposed modifications must be analyzed in relation to
the current goals of contract law. The reasoning behind this form of analysis is
twofold. First, such an analysis will show that court-imposed modifications are
consonant with current contractual theory. Second, the analysis is appropriate be-
cause imposing modification is not a panacea that will eliminate all the prob-
lems associated with discharge cases; rather, it is another tool for a court to use
in equitably resolving a contractual dispute.
176. Appellee's Brief to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 3, ALCOA.
177. Id. at 20-21.
178. Id. at 3.
179. Id. at 20-21.
180. See supia notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
182. See id.
183. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
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A. Effectuating Commercial Relationships
Contract law today places continually greater emphasis on preserving con-
tractual relationships. This current emphasis is partly attributable to the recognition
that "planning is inherently filled with gaps."' 18 4 Therefore, a number of doctrines
have been developed to automatically fill some gaps and to assist the parties in filling
others.
A principal development in this area is the implication of usage of trade,1 85 prior
course of dealing, 186 and course of performance' 8 7 into contracts. Basically, the
rationale behind these interpretative aids is that the parties' conduct under the agree-
ment is the best indication of what the agreement means; 188 therefore, the parties'
past conduct should be used to fill any gaps. These automatic gap fillers are sup-
plemented by doctrines such as modification 189 and waiver' 90 that make it easier for
the parties themselves to fill gaps.
Both to make it easier for the parties to fill gaps and to maintain the flexible
nature of contractual relationships,' 9' the requirement of consideration for a mod-
ification has been greatly relaxed.' 92 Coinciding with the relaxation of the require-
ments for a modification is the ability of a court to find waiver of a term whenever
necessary to "preserve the flexible character of commercial contracts."' 93 In this
context, court-imposed modifications appear consistent with effectuating contractual
relationships.
Essentially, a court-imposed modification is an attempt by the court to provide
for the impact of a supervening event by modifying the contract. The court is not
rewriting the contract; rather, it is filling a gap in the contract caused by a superven-
ing event.' 94 The imposition of a modification to meet the exigency of a supervening
event is in accord with preserving the flexible character of commercial relations-it
both maintains the vitality of the contractual relationship and encourages the parties
to reach an out-of-court modification.' 9
5
The imposition of a modification in a discharge case, in essence, is equivalent to
the imposition of a term into a contract based on a prior course of performance. Both
actions have the same purpose: to fill a gap consistent with the parties' intentions.
Morever, both actions usually have the same result: resolution of the problem and
184. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 873 (1978).
185. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 222; U.C.C. § 1-205 (1978).
186. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 223; U.C.C. § 1-205 (1978).
187. See U.C.C. § 2-208(l)-(2) (1978).
188. See id. § 2-208 comment 1.
189. RESTATEMENr, supra note 4, § 89(a); U.C.C. § 2-209 (1978).
190. See U.C.C. § 2-208 comment 3 (1978).
191. See U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 1 (1978) (declares its purpose to be the effectuation of "all necessary and
desirable modifications").
192. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 89(a) dispenses with the consideration requirement if the modification is fair
and equitable. Similarly, U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1978) dispenses with the consideration requirement if the
modification is for any legitimate commercial reason.
193. U.C.C. § 2-208 comment 3 (1978).
194. This is fundamentally the position taken by RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 272(2). Filling a gap created by a
supervening event is equivalent to filling in an omitted essential term. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
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maintenance of the contract's viability and flexibility. Thus, even though court-
imposed modifications are based on the court's perception of the parties' original
intentions, court-imposed modifications are similar to other gap-filling doctrines.
B. Keeping Contracting Parties Together
Contract law has become increasingly concerned with keeping contracting par-
ties together until both sides have performed. This concern is evidenced by the
obstacles that prevent a party from suspending performance upon a belief that the
other party is in breach.
Initially a party who believes that his or her contracting partner has breached
must consider whether the contract could be subject to divisible contract analysis. 196
In this regard, the party would also have to determine if the other party's partial
performance could fall within the doctrine of substantial performance. 197 Even if
these doctrines are inapplicable, for one party to be discharged from the duty to
perform, the other party must commit a total breach, which requires that the conduct
of the alleged breaching party "substantially" impair the value of the entire con-
tract.198 Furthermore, the ability of the other party to cure the defective performance
must always be considered.' 99 Finally, the extent to which the alleged breaching





The emphasis on keeping contracting parties together can also be seen in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts' "more liberal" attitude toward specific per-
formance.20 1 In taking this more liberal attitude, the Restatement affirms the position
taken by the Uniform Commercial Code on specific performance. 20 2 Further, the
Restatement takes a new approach to the adequacy of damages: "Adequacy is to
some extent relative, and the modem approach is to compare remedies to determine
which is more effective in serving the ends of justice. Such a comparison will often
lead to the granting of equitable relief. Doubts should be resolved in favor
of... specific performance or injunction." ' 20 3 Finally, in considering the difficul-
ties that attend an order of specific performance, the Restatement advises that "[a]p-
parent difficulties of enforcement due to uncertainty may disappear in the light of
courageous common sense.' '204
A principal reason for keeping contracting parties together is the inadequacy of
damages. 205 The inadequacy may be caused by various factors, but is likely to be
196. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 233(2); U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (1978).
197. See REsrAi ENr, supra note 4, §§ 243, 237 comment d; U.C.C. § 2-612(2) (1978).
198. See REsTATEENr, supra note 4, § 243(4).
199. See REsTAT'rFr, supra note 4, § 237 & comment b (party has an absolute right to cure); U.C.C. § 2-508(1)
(1978) (right to cure, but not absolute in the sale of goods).
200. See REsTATM,ENT, supra note 4, § 241(e).
201. REsTATEmENr, supra note 4, ch. 16 introductory note.
202. The "'inability to cover is strong evidence of' the propriety of granting specific performance." RESTATEmENT,
supra note 4, § 360 comment c (quoting U.C.C. § 2-716 comment 2 (1978)).
203. REsTATMw, supra note 4, § 359 comment a,
204. Id. § 362 comment b.
205. See generally Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); Fuller
& Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937).
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found when the parties contract over an extended period of time. The longer the
contractual relationship, the greater the probability that one or both parties have taken
actions in reliance upon it. The reliance placed upon the contractual relationship may
manifest itself through ancillary contracts based upon the continued existence of the
relationship. 0 6 The reliance also may be displayed by a party's actions based solely
upon the existence of the contractual relationship. 207 In either situation, the need to
keep the contracting parties together is increased.
The traditional approach, however, does not permit a court to take into con-
sideration the reliance that may have occurred. The issue under the all-or-nothing
approach often is simply whether a sufficient economic burden has been placed upon
one party. The total impact that may accompany the termination of an agreement
upon the contracting parties or third persons is irrelevant.
Conversely, court-imposed modifications are most appropriate when reliance
has occurred. Indeed, the interrelationship between the contracting parties themselves
and third parties may be the principal reason a modification is imposed. Court-
imposed modifications, therefore, are more consistent with the policy of keeping
contracting parties together than the all-or-nothing approach.
C. The Loss Will Not Go Away208
Many courts apparently believe that their decisions in discharge cases resolve
the problem. This belief, however, is erroneous. The economic loss caused by the
intervention of a supervening event does not simply go away after a court renders its
decision. Rather, under the all-or-nothing approach, regardless of the outcome, one
party is forced to internalize the loss caused by the supervening event.
The traditional approach furnishes a judge with two options in apportioning the
loss. Through an order of specific performance, he or she can force one party to
continue to perform at a loss. 20 9 Alternatively, the court can discharge one party, and
thus force the other party to find a substitute supplier, who often charges a higher
price. Under the second alternative, the party attempting to secure a substitute sup-
plier may be at a severe bargaining disadvantage because he or she may need the
substitute goods to perform other contracts. 2 10 Court-imposed modifications, how-
ever, will provide a judge with a third, more equitable alternative.
Imposing a modification will permit a court to alleviate the loss in a discharge
case. A court will be able to fashion a modification to equitably spread the loss
between the parties. Moreover, even if the initial burden is placed upon one party, the
206. See, e.g., supra note 98 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
208. This phrase, although not quoted exactly, comes from F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTrRACTS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 743 (2d ed. 1970).
209. See, e.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 865 (1979) (court's order of specific performance forced Peabody to perform at a loss).
210. Consider, for example, the position of a house builder who has contracted to build a house and whose lumber
supplier is subsequently discharged from an ancillary agreement because of a lumber shortage. The house builder,
notwithstanding the discharge of the lumber supplier, will still be bound to build the house within the time and at the price
provided by contract. Therefore, the house builder will have no alternative-other than breach-but to go into the lumber
market and pay an inflated price for the lumber.
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court can adjust for this burden over the term of the contract in its fashioning of the
modification. Thus, court-imposed modifications will permit a slow, deliberate loss-
apportionment, rather than the abrupt, all-or-nothing result caused by applying the
traditional approach to discharge cases. Although some courts may scoff at loss-
splitting in this manner, they would do well to bear in mind that "the loss having
occurred, neither a rule of strict liability nor a rule of easy discharge will make the
loss go away.",
2 11
D. Implying a Modification
After recognizing the efficacy of court-imposed modifications, the judge must
determine when they should be imposed. Because of a lack of case law guidelines,
judges may be apprehensive about imposing modifications. Nevertheless, by apply-
ing existing case law and logic some broad guidelines can be developed.
A basic, oversimplified test can be stated as follows: when "neither sense nor
justice ' 212 will be served by adherence to the traditional approach, a court-imposed
modification is appropriate. In determining when sense and justice require a mod-
ification, a variety of factors can be considered. First, the use of court-imposed
modifications should generally be limited to long-term contracts; the reasons for
implying a modification-to keep the contracting parties together and to protect the
parties' expectations-are not present in discrete transactions. 213 Second, the court
should determine the extent to which imposing an all-or-nothing solution will cause
undeserved losses to be imposed on a party. In making this determination, the court
should consider the parties' expectations; simply comparing the market price with the
contract price may under-evaluate the party's actual position. 214 Third, actions taken
in reliance upon the continuing vitality of the contract should be considered. Included
in this category are actions premised solely upon the existence of the contract2 15 and
the entrance into ancillary agreements premised upon the continuing vitality of the
contract.216 A critical consideration in this context would be the reasonableness of the
reliance;2 17 a court, of course, should not protect unreasonable or capricious actions
taken by a party. Fourth, the effect of the termination on third parties or the public
should be considered. The public interest may be an especially germane consideration
when the termination will result in loss of jobs2 18 or decrease in competition. 2 19 Last,
the court should give weight to the extent to which the parties' conduct has been
consistent with the current standards of good faith and fair dealing. 220 This considera-
211. F. KESSLER & G. GIuioPE, CONTRAcrs: CASES AND MATouALS 743 (2d ed. 1970).
212. U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 6 (1978).
213. See Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Rav. 854, 856-64 (1978).
214. See supra text accompanying note 105.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
216. See supra text accompanying note 98.
217. See REsTATEMtENT, supra note 4, § 90 comment b.
218. In ALCOA, for example, if Essex had been forced to close its processing plant, it is likely that a number of
people would have been put out of work. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
219. In ALCOA, for example, if Essex had to withdraw from the several aluminum businesses in which it had been
able to compete because of the Molten Metal Agreement, competition obviously would have decreased. See supra note
111 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 64-65.
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tion may also be important in structuring the modification, for, of course, the court
will want to reward conduct exemplifying a high standard of fair dealing.
The above mentioned considerations provide merely a rough guideline. This
Comment is unable to set out every possible consideration and the weight to be
accorded to it. This task can only be accomplished by a court after analyzing the facts
of the particular case. Clearly, guidelines can be established only after courts have
created jurisprudence on point. But the current lack of criteria cannot justify a court's
refusal to impose a modification. If all courts refuse to impose modifications because
of the lack of guidance, the necessary case law to establish guidelines will never
exist. Therefore, judges must take the initiative if guidelines are to be established.
VI. CONCLUSION
One commentator has characterized Judge Teitelbaum's opinion in ALCOA as
going "too far too fast.' 221 This Comment, however, has shown that court-imposed
modifications are not a new and radical innovation, but are consistent with the goals
and objectives of contract law. Court-imposed modifications are consonant with
gap-filling in contracts and provide a flexible process for dispute resolution. Further-
more, because the arguments against court-imposed modifications are unpersuasive,
no real barrier to a court's taking the initiative and imposing a modification exists.
In 1924 Justice Cardozo, in a lecture to a group of law students, speculated that
"[p]erhaps, with a higher conception of business and its needs, the time will come
when even revision will be permitted if it is revision in consonance with established
standards of fair dealing, but the time is not yet. ' ' 222 Perhaps in 1983, with the
intervening changes in contract law, Justice Cardozo would state that the time has
come.
Robert W. Reeder III
221. Professor Speidel reached this conclusion in his article, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term
Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 369, 421 n.204 (1981). Professor Speidel contends that court-imposed mod-
ifications should be imposed only when a party has exhibited bad faith in post-bargaining negotiations. Id. at 404-22. The
author of this Comment believes that this test is unmanageable and would be applicable so infrequently that it would defeat
the purpose of court-imposed modifications.
First, the post-bargaining analysis will be frustrated by the positions of the parties and by the verbal nature of the bulk
of negotiations. By the time the parties decide to litigate, their positions have become polarized. See Macaulay, The Use
andNon-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, PRAc. LAw., Nov. 1963, at 13, 17-18. Hence, the court will be
attempting to get information concerning, to a significant extent, verbal negotiations from parties who probably will have
very different views of the negotiations. Because negotiations usually are not transcribed or recorded, a judge may have
considerable difficulty in determining the exact offers and counter offers that were made by the parties. This information,
however, would be crucial in determining if one party had acted in bad faith.
Second, the principal problem is with proving bad faith in a post-bargaining situation. Beginning from the principle
that it is not bad faith for an advantaged party to refuse to modify a contract, Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal
Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979), it is difficult to conceive of a situation in
which a party's actions in the post-bargaining situation would constitute bad faith. Apparently, in only the most flagrant
cases could bad faith be proved. Thus, Professor Speidel's approach would limit the imposition of modifications to a few
exceptional cases.
Last, Professor Speidel's approach focuses on the behavior of the parties-not the need for a modification. If a
modification is appropriate under the circumstances, the behavior of one of the parties, although certainly a factor to be
considered in formulating the modification, should not be controlling. This would be especially true when the interests of
third parties or the general public are implicated.
222. B. CARDOZO, SMECTED WRITrNOS oF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 236 (M. Hall ed. 1947) (footnote
omitted).
